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DUE PROCESS OF FOREIGN POLICY:
PROPOSALS FOR PRESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES
LUIS KUTNER*
I do perceive here a divided duty.
Othello, Act 1, sc. 2
No man is wise enough, nor good enough, to be trusted with unlim-
ited power.
C. C. Colton
The greater the power the more dangerous the abuse.
Edmund Burke
I. INTRODUCTION
President Nixon's decision to send United States ground forces into
Cambodia -without congressional consent- added considerable fuel to
the fires of debate over the already inflammable constitutional issue on
the scope of Presidential power in the conduct of American foreign policy.
In that regard this article examines the proper place of the President
vis-h-vis Congress in the area of foreign policy decision-making.
The salient question is: Who determines foreign policy? President
Truman boldly asserted to a visiting group of Jewish War Veterans, "I
make American foreign policy."' However, Edward S. Corwin suggested
"What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the
President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and
certain other powers of the same general kind . . . on Congress." On
the question of who shall have the "decisive and final voice" on foreign
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policy, Corwin added that " . . . the power to determine the substantive
content of American foreign policy is a divided power, with the lion's
share falling usually, though by no means always, to the President."3
The President has the initiative in foreign policy, with vast powers;
in the words of Bernard Schwartz, "It is the President who gives the
lead to the nation in matters touching foreign affairs.' 4 But this does not
mean that the power of the President in foreign policy should be
unrestrained, nor is it intended to be so. For example, on such an
important feature of foreign policy as whether or not to go to war, the
American people want an opportunity to be heard on a decision so
vital to their interests and welfare. The people find that voice through
their duly elected representatives in Congress. If an arbitrary ruler has
the power to engage a country in war at any time, then war will be
more likely. As Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote, "In 1776, Americans flatly
rejected the theory of government by an autocrat of vast powers
and they confirmed that eleven years later in the Constitution.
5
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS A COMPASS
The men who drafted the Federal Constitution deliberately limited
the powers of government because they feared that a government where
all powers were concentrated in one man or one group of men would,
before long, result in a dictatorship. The Framers set out their checks and
balances in a written Constitution, carefully separating powers between
the three branches so that no one department would be able to exercise
all the powers given the Federal Government.
Thus, in the field of foreign affairs, the Federal Government had
inherent, exclusive and plenary powers, though, the control over foreign
relations was not conferred upon any single branch. The Founding
Fathers decided against delegating all powers in foreign affairs to the
legislature, which had been the case under the Articles of Confederation,
and they likewise rejected the theories of Blackstone, Locke and Montes-
quieu that the executive should have the sole power in foreign relations.6
While the conduct of external relations with other nations was a
function confided to the executive arm of government under the Con.
stitution, 7 it was the intent of the Founders to explicitly grant to Congress
the power to do certain things. These exclusive powers are enumerated
in Section 8 of Article I. Congress alone is given the power "To declare
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War . . .". This is a limitation on the President to order the armed
forces to commit an act of war. Abraham Lincoln spoke of the necessity
of conferring the right to declare war upon Congress:
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power
to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following rea-
sons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their
people in wars, pretending generally if not always, that the good
of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be
most oppressive, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that
no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression
upon us.'
Furthermore, a safeguard against the suspected possibility that a Presi-
dent might desire to create a permanent military force is found in the
power of Congress "To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years." Congress
also has the power "To provide and maintain a Navy" and "To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval forces."
As for the President's relationship to the armed forces, Article I,
Section 2, states that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States. . . " The Constitutional Con-
vention, in making the President Commander in Chief, sought to place
the tactical control of troops in the field under a single civilian leader.9
Clearly the Congress could not order battles to be fought on a certain
plan, nor direct parts of the Army to be moved from one part of the
country to another. Senator Sam Ervin underscored that point when
he declared,
. . . the Founding Fathers were not foolish enough to place the
command of American troops engaged in combat operation in a
Congress of the United States. . . . I cannot imagine anything that
would more nearly resemble bedlam than to have a council of war
composed of 100 Senators and 435 Representatives to determine
where the enemy is going to be undertaken, or how to protect
American forces from destruction of an armed enemy.1"
The President is properly limited in the exercise of his constitu-
tional power as Commander in Chief to the defense of the United States,
its citizens and their property. The President's authority to protect the
lives of Americans and their property with the Army and the Navy
grows out of his control over foreign relations, as well as his duty to
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enforce the obligations of the Government to its own citizens." While
Presidents have sent United States troops into different countries more
than 150 times in the past without a declaration of war from Congress
(according to the Washington Star, May 17, 1970), 12 in most cases those
forces were landed to protect American lives and property. The Supreme
Court has upheld that the citizen abroad is entitled to the same protection
as the citizen at home, and under the canons of international law, which
recognize the right of persons and property, action of this sort is not
considered an act of war.' 3
The examples here are numerous. Henry Steele Commager cites
actions taken by Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt
as "most interesting," but they were not, as he contends, "examples of
the exercise of Presidential powers that brought the nation to the verge
of war.'"" During the Boxer Rebellion, McKinley dispatched American
troops into the "heart of China" because the legations in Peking were
besieged and the legitimate Government of China was unable to defend
them against the rebelling Boxers. The various nations sent expeditionary
forces to rescue their nationals who were in the legations. McKinley
sent 5,000 soldiers into China without consulting Congress; he maintained
that his action "involved no war against the Chinese nation," and,
therefore, required no congressional authorization.' 5 The President's
use of the troops were specifically limited to the protection of American
citizens-those American diplomats whose lives were threatened contrary
to international law. This was a clear effort to save American lives and
property, and it was not an action that would have involved this nation
in war. Moreover, the Chinese Imperial Government formally acknowl-
edged that fact.16
"The modern expansion of the President's power to use troops
abroad," claims Merlo J. Pusey, "began under Theodore Roosevelt."
17
When Roosevelt seized Panama to acquire a canal zone, he proclaimed
with his usual bravado, "I took Panama and let Congress debate, and
while the debate goes on the canal does also."' 18 While those words
were, in themselves, an admission by the President that his action was
unlawful, it cannot be considered the exercising of "war" powers.
The act of President Woodrow Wilson in seizing Veracruz was an
act of war without congressional authorization at the time it was com-
mitted. However, a resolution authorizing that action was pending at the
time; it had already passed one House of Congress, and the other House
was in the course of taking action to ratify that act.19 The joint resolu-
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Lion was approved a short time after the landing was made at Veracruz.
The relevant portions of it read:
Resolved by the Senate and House oj Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President
is justified in the employment of armed forces of the United States
to enforce his demands for unequivocal amends for certain affronts
and indignities committed against the United States.
Be it further resolved, That the United States disclaims any
hostilities to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon
Mexico.2 0
In the more recent case of the Dominican intervention, President
Johnson's move to land the Marines in Santo Domingo for the initial
purpose of protecting American lives was justified without congressional
approval. Although the act of the President was later denounced in
Congress on the grounds that "the real purpose of intervention was
the defeat of the Dominican revolution," 21 it was defensible under the
Monroe Doctrine to assist in meeting such a growth of Communist ag-
gression from within by sending forces to a state under attack in the
Americas, the net result of which was the maintenance of peace and
protection in the Western Hemisphere. 22
It was never intended by the Founders that the President have com-
plete, arbitrary control over the disposition of the military and naval
forces.2 5 The power of the President to send troops anywhere in the
world rests on the condition that he cannot send said troops abroad if the
sending of same amounts to making war. Writing in the Virginia Law
Journal, W. Taylor Reverly, III, notes in his article on the war-making
power:
It seems reasonably clear from proposals made and rejected at
the Constitutional Convention, from debates there, subsequent state-
ments by the Framers and from practice in early years that the
Drafters intended decisions regarding the initiation of forces abroad
to be made not by the President alone, not by the Senate alone, nor
by the President and Senate but by the entire Congress subject to
the signature or veto of the President.24
It is held in some quarters that the President has the power to begin
war as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.2 5 Because the
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President is Commander in Chief, if he wants to send the Army and
Navy anywhere in the world, they will obey him. In that respect, then,
the President may have it within his power to make war, without the
authority of Congress, on a foreign land by ordering the Army to land
on a foreign coast. William Howard Taft concluded in an article on
Presidential power: "Of course, the President may so use the Army and
Navy to involve the country in actual war and force a declaration of war
by Congress. Such a use of the Army and Navy, however, is a usurpa-
tion of power on his part. ' 26 Thus, it is one thing to say that the Presi-
dent has the power to order the Army into action, and quite another,
indeed, to say that he has any legal or constitutional right to do so. Cor-
win has pointed-out that "the President has been able to gather to himself
powers with respect to warmaking that ill accord with the specific dele-
gation in the Constitution of the war-declaring powers to Congress.12 7
The mere fact that power may be usurped does not mean, nor does it
offer any conclusive evidence, that the President has any legal right to
precipitate open warfare.
The objection may be raised here that if a President can do certain
things, he cannot be prevented from usurping power, so why bother to
challenge his right to do so. Richard Neustadt, who served in advisory
capacities under both Presidents Truman and Kennedy, holds that a
President creates his own role as leader by the way in which he ac-
quires and uses power; if the Executive were only to rely on his formal
powers, according to Neustadt, it would seriously cramp the potentials for
leadership in the Presidency.28 Louis Koenig, of New York University,
refers to the President "struggling with great difficulties under the con-
fines of our political system to develop an imaginary and vigorous for-
eign policy" and asserts that in the nuclear age the office of the Presi-
dency has adapted itself to become one "in which the largest decisions
in foreign affairs repose ...that allowed Truman to order the use of the
atomic bomb against Japan . . . that can act on an instant's notice in
defense of the nation ... and utilizes the Commander-in-Chiefs powers to
conduct the enterprise that might well be called Presidential war-
making." 29 In a sweeping claim for Executive power, Koenig concludes
that this "independent" Presidency
possesses a maximum autonomy, in which the President in relative
privacy can make decisions that choose between war and peace, that
commit treasures and lives, and that may determine the nation's fore.
most priorities for years to come. The President may make these
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decisions in secrecy and freedom, beyond the reach and even knowl-
edge of Congress and the people. Or, if Congress or the people are
related to that decision, they can act only marginally. They have no
real choice but to ratify what the President has done or will do.30
In effect, Congress no longer has any power to act. Congress is
merely given the right to support the President after he has already
acted. Without allowing for full and free discussion of foreign policy-
so essential to the preservation of the nation's constitutional liberties and
democratic tradition-Congress would simply be handed pre-determined
plans and then the lawmakers asked to ratify faits accomplis. It would
mean the people's representatives in Congress were being dealt out of
foreign policy planning. This does not square with the constitutional
system based on the division and limitation of powers.
In viewing the true Executive functions, the powers a President can
exercise have their source in the Federal Constitution and in the laws
of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. The ambit of power in which
the Executive can operate is plainly marked for him, if in general terms.
The President, then, can exercise no power which is not granted to him
expressly or impliedly by either the Constitution or an act of Congress.
Simply, if a power cannot be reasonably traced to a constitutional or
statutory provision, it does not exist. Judge Augustus N. Hand expounded
on that view in his opinion in United States v. Western Union:31
If the President has the original power sought to be exercised,
it must be found expressly or by implication in the Constitution.
It is not sufficient to say that he must have it because the United
States is a sovereign nation and must be deemed to have all cus-
tomary national powers. . . . I cannot regard a failure of Congress
to exercise its unlimited powers as proof that some other branch
of the government has the right to do what Congress might readily
authorize.
While the Constitution says that the President shall be Commander in
Chief, that certainly does not include the right to make war by sending
American soldiers overseas.
The President does have the right and duty to resist insurrection
and invasion of the United States. If a nation makes or declares war on
the United States, it is the President's duty to carry on that war. The
"path to duty," however, has indeed become "a road to power."32
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IlI. PRESIDENTIAL WAR-MAKING
Before the Mexican War the relationship between Congress and the
President had been one of co-operation in the formulating of foreign
policy. President Polk's use of the Army against Mexico marked the
beginning of the practice whereby the President presented a fait accompli
to a subservient Congress. 33 In the case of the Mexican Rebellion, Polk
ordered United States armed troops, under the command of General
Taylor, across the Nueces, and by that action began the Mexican War.3 4
In his message to Congress, Polk said:
After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of
the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American
blood, upon the American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities
have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war.
As war now exists, and not withstanding all our efforts to avoid
it, exists by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every
consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with honor, the
rights, and the interests of our country.
In further vindication of our rights and defense of our territory,
I invoke the prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of
the war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means
of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration
of peace. 5
The United States was at war by order of the President. On the
floor of the Senate, Calhoun charged that Polk had carried on a foreign
war against Mexico before Congress had authorized it. "In the sense
of the Constitution," Calhoun reminded, "war could be declared only
by Congress." '36 Another to challenge Polk's right was Abraham Lincoln,
who in a letter dated the 15th of February, 1848, wrote his law-partner,
William Herndon: "Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow
him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for
such purpose- and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to
see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect. . . -37 Lincoln
continued his analysis of the situation, saying:
If today he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade
Canada to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop
him? You may say to him "I see no probability of the British in-
vading us," but he will say to you, "Be silent: I see it, if you don't."318
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A cursory examination of the pre-war foreign policy of Franklin
D. Roosevelt also provides an example of how the President took per-
sistent efforts to involve America in war, albeit paying lip-service to the
Congress' "power to declare war." Mr. Roosevelt, in June 1940 before the
presidential election of that year, encouraged Premier Reynard to stand
up against the Germans who had already broken through into France-
yet, the President was careful to qualify the promise of aid" in his
message of June 15, 1940, to Reynard:
39
In these hours which are so heart-rending to the French people
and yourself, I send you assurances of my utmost sympathy, and
I can further assure you that so long as the French people continue
in the defense of their liberty, which constitutes the cause of popu-
lar institutions throughout the world, so long will they rest assured
that material and supplies will be sent to them from the United
States in ever-increasing quantities and kinds.
I know that you will understand that these statements carry
with them no implications of military commitments. Only Congress
can make such commitments. 40
Roosevelt, however, proceeded to do exactly what he said he had
no power to do. In 1941, less than five months after he had pledged
not to send American forces of the Army, Navy, or Air Force to fight
in foreign countries except in ease of attack, the President requested
the Lend-Lease Bill, giving him the unlimited personal authority to loan
out across the seas as much as he saw fit, without coming to Congress
for appropriations or further authority. A dangerous aspect of the bill
was its provisions giving the President unlimited power to carry on an
undeclared war against any nation in the world-which could have
eventually catapulted the nation into the shooting end of the war, along
with the service-of-supply end as justified by the bill. There were other
actions of the Administration's foreign policy, following Lend-Lease,
designated to lead the country into war: the seizure of Axis ships while
we were supposed to be neutral, the sending of American ships into the
combat zone, the occupation of Iceland, and the repeal of the Neutrality
Act.41 None of these had any relation to the national defense; all were
acts of war.
In the Iceland adventure, Roosevelt's arbitrary action of usurping
authority to send the United States Navy to Iceland to replace the British
contingent stationed there was strenuously protested by Senator Robert
A. Taft:
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It would be a tremendous stretching of the Constitution to say
that without authority from Congress the President of the United
States can send hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to
Europe when a war is raging over the entire continent, and the pres-
ence of American troops would inevitably lead to war. The President
cannot make aggressive war. Neither can he intervene in a war be-
tween two nations, because such intervention, even though it does
not immediately involve a physical attack on one of the combatants,
is clearly the making of war .... 42
Since 1945 the two major wars in which the United States has be-
come involved-Korea and Vietnam have been what Louis Koenig calls
"Presidential wars," where Congress has not exercised its constitutional
power to declare war.43
In the Korean intervention, President Truman responded to the un-
provoked attack of the North Korean Communists against the Republic
of Korea when he announced in a statement released to the press on
June 27, 1950: " . . . The Security Council of the United Nations called
upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th
parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the
attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United
Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execu-
tion of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United
States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and
support." 44
There is no doubt that the President usurped powers as Commander-
in-Chief where he had no constitutional authority to send forces into
Korea, thus, bringing about a de lacto war with the Government of North
Korea. At no time was Congress consulted for its approval to use Ameri-
can armed forces in Korea. Before the issuance of his June 27th state.
ment, Truman did call in a handful of Senators and Representatives, "so
that I might inform them on the events and the decisions of the past
few days," according to his Memoirs, "and I asked the views of the
congressional leaders ... [and they] approved of my action. '45 But this
was hardly a formal assembly of Congress.
Nor was there anything in the United Nations Charter to authorize
the intervention in Korea, though it has been contended that the entire
Korean matter was changed by the obligation into which this nation had
entered under that Charter.46 The obligation to send troops on the call
of the Security Council is limited by Article 43, requiring that troops
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can only be called for when an agreement has been entered into with the
Security Council; Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of
1945, whereby the Senate accepted the Charter, determines the circum-
stances under which the President may provide military aid in support
of the Security Council: the President is authorized to negotiate special
agreements with the Security Council, subject to the approval of the
Congress.4 7 As emphasized by Corwin,
[T]he controlling theory of the act is that American participa-
tion in the United Nations shall rest on the principle of departmental
collaboration, and not on an exclusive presidential prerogative .. .
not only is this a sound constitutional principle . . . it is the only
practicable principle unless we wish to establish outright presidential
dictatorship.48
In the case of Korea, however, Congress never acted because no agree-
ment on the matter was ever submitted to it, contrary to the law that,
in the absence of prior congressional approval, there is no authority to
use armed forces in support of the United Nations.
Unlike Truman, who by-passed the Congress when he committed
American troops to war in Korea, President Eisenhower obtained direct
authority from Congress to use armed forces to prevent a Chinese
Communist take-over of Formosa and to assist in defending the Middle
East as another means of preventing the spread of Communism.
49
In parallel, many people purport the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, adopted
almost unanimously by Congress, August 7, 1964, at the request of
President Johnson, to be "an unqualified Congressional endorsement of
the war in Vietnam." 50 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, or South East
Asia Resolution, authorized the President ". . . to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further agressions." 51 Wayne Morse, one of the two
Senators to vote against the resolution, warned, "We are in effect, giving
the President of the United States war-making powers in the absence of
a declaration of war. I believe that to be a historic mistake."
52 In
retrospect, Senator J. William Fulbright condemns the resolution as a
"blank check," and emphatically stresses,
* ..The fundamental mistake . ..was in the giving away of
that which is not ours to give. The war power is vested by the
Constitution in the Congress, and if it is to be transferred to the
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executive, the transfer can be legitimately effected only by con-
stitutional amendment, not by inadvertency of Congress.53
This raises a crucial constitutional caveat, for the adoption of such a
resolution gave direct authority from Congress to the President to carry
on an undeclared war. While President Johnson did ask Congress for
approval to use armed forces in South East Asia, he did not seek a
declaration of war.54 Yet, there can be no retreat from reality; the conflict
in Vietnam found the United States in her longest and most costly
military campaign, and there is no longer any doubt that it was involved
in a de facto war. Clearly, as the operation in Vietnam began to take on
the dimensions of war the Constitution required that Congress be consulted
for a declaration of war. Of course, it was not. 55
As a matter of moral principle, the actions taken by Presidents
Truman in Korea, Johnson in Vietnam, and Nixon in Cambodia are
unassailable. Still, as a matter of legal principle, if a President's usurpa-
tion of power to send American soldiers into war without congressional
approval is permitted to go by unprotested in the Senate, tilen it will
vitiate for all time the authority specifically reserved to Congress to
declare war by the Constitution of the United States. Again Senator
Fulbright points out:
A Senator has the obligation to defend the Senate as an
institution by upholding its traditions and prerogatives. . . . Whoever
may be President, whatever his policies, however great the confidence
they may inspire, it is part of the constitutional trust of a Senator
to defend and exercise the advice and consent function of the
Senate. It is not his to give away.
56
In 1970, the Congress began to flex its long dormant "constitutional
muscle" by clearly asserting its right to properly limit the President's
power to send troops abroad without congressional approval. The
Cooper-Church Amendment, as modified by the Byrd Amendment, adopted
by the Senate, and its companion proposal offered in the House, the Reid
Amendment, as amended by the Findley Amendment, presented a definite
statement by Congress that it has the right, through the implementation
of its appropriation power, to pass on the question of sending troops to
Asia. Taken together, the proposals prohibited the use of funds to
introduce American ground forces into Cambodia - or Laos, or Thailand
- except to protect the lives of American troops still remaining in
South Vietnam. From the standpoint of due process, the proposals, as
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amended, were consistent with congressional authority, as well as the
inherent powers of the President in the defense of our forces. The clear
assertion of this position by Congress demonstrated that while its
power has oft times lain dormant, this did not mean its power had been
abandoned: "for in the constitutional scheme of things Congress cannot
abandon it.'' z The presumption is that a President will follow the laws
passed by Congress, and he acts at his own peril, then, if he chooses to
usurp authority which the people's representatives in Congress have
asserted he does not possess. With considerable White House support,
congressional opponents turned back the Senate's legislative attempt to
curb Presidential power. At the urging of the House, the controversial
Cooper-Church Amendment was totally excised from the Foreign Military
Sales Act and the issue was temporarily delused.53
Another most relevant proposal was the McGovern-Hatfield Amend-
ment, the "Amendment to End the War." Howard K. Smith commented
that "Congress has plenty of control, above all the power of the purse.
It can stop cold any military action by denying funds."5 9 "A Legal
Memorandum on the Amendment to End the War," prepared under the
direction of the Harvard Law Review, went considerably further in dis-
cussing the constitutionality of the Senate proposal:
The debates in the Constitutional Convention clearly indicate
one thing: Congress was given ultimate control over the war-making
power, with a variety of means at its command to enforce its views.
At the minimum the framers would have viewed an appropriation
restricted in use to disbanding an army and bringing it home as a
proper exerciser of Congressional power .. ..The Constitution, read
in the light of historical context and the framers' fear of a military
establishment, thus establishes that the President could command the
tactical operation of an army while engaged, but that Congress had
the power through appropriations to provide an army, to disband it,
or to disengage it from a particular theater of operations.
60
That Congress has the constitutional power of appropriations cannot
be argued; but neither can it be argued that, by appropriating money for
additional action in Vietnam, Congress ratified a de lacto war as de jure.
Recognizing a war was on, there seemed to be little room for independent
congressional action. The only available choice was to back-up with
wholehearted and unstinting support, and with every available resource,
the men in our armed forces fighting in South East Asia at the direction
of the President. In a letter to Senator Gordon Allott, Franz Michael,
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director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, also cautioned that a
complete withdrawal from Vietnam "would not protect us from enlarged
problems of the same kind. What is at stake is not only the issue of the
Communists' further advance into new areas, but also our whole stand-
ing and credibility with all our allies in Asia . . .,,6" Predictably,
supporters of the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment were to experience
defeat at the hands of the legislative process. But the debate stirred by
the Amendment was still another indictation of the continuing congres-
sional concern in this constitutional area. 62
The continuing debate surrounding the apparent abdication by the
Congress of its constitutionally-mandated responsibility to declare war,
was finally resolved in its favor. The Congress forcefully confronted the
constitutional issue and passed, over a Presidential veto, the "War
Powers Act." As indicated earlier, American troops have been committed
in various armed conflicts by the President, without his seeking any
formal declaration of war from the Congress. Criticism of this seeming
usurpation of legislative power further crystalized following the Cam-
bodian incursion. During the 93rd Congress, aided by the public
awareness sensitized by the debates over the Cooper-Church and McGovern-
Hatfield Amendments, 16 bills were filed in the House to specifically
limit the President's ability to send US fighting troops abroad without
congressional approval. A bi-partisan bill with numerous sponsors was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Jacob Javits. (S-540).
On October 12, 1973, the Congress sent to the President for his
signature the so-called, "War Powers Act". The crux of the legislation
was to require the President to notify the Congress within forty-eight
hours of the reasons why he committed United States troops abroad. If
the Congress has not affirmatively approved his action by the passage
of a declaration of war within sixty days following the committment - with
the possibility of a thirty day extension - the Congress could halt
operations by the passage of a concurrent resolution that need not be
submitted to the President. The President vetoed the bill on October 24,
1973, and the Congress successfully overrode his veto on November 7,
1973.63 It would seem clear from the constitutional viewpoint that the
Congress had merely statutorily verified what the Constitution clearly
required. It remains a prerogative of the Congress to decide whether
or not the United States should send her troops to war.
Many critics of the legislation agreed with Senator John Tower
that, "the sooner a constitutional challenge is launched, the better." 6 In
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his veto message, President Nixon detailed why he felt the legislation
would be deemed unconstitutional:
House Joint Resolution 542 would take away by mere legisla-
tive act, authorities which the President has exercised for almost
200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain
authorities after 60 days unless the Congress extended them. Another
would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by
the passage of a concurrent resolution which does not normally have
the force of law since it denies the President his constitutional role
in approving legislation."5
Other critics have argued that the legislation would effectively "hand-
cuff" the President and render him unable to successfully meet the kinds
of "crises" faced by U.S. Presidents during the past decade. Presidential
handling of the crises in Berlin, Cuba, the Congo, Jordan and the
Middle East are cited as examples of the kinds of responses that may
be limited under the new legislation to the detriment of the United
States.
From the legal point of view, it seems unnecessary to respond to
much of the criticism. It seems clear the Congress has boldly asserted its
power without encroaching upon that of the Executive. This congressional
awakening is long overdue in an area for which it has sole responsibility.
As Senator Javits stated before the final Senate vote to override the
Presidential veto;
* . * (we are) not impairing the President's authority to carry
out the foreign policy of the country. But we are affecting materially
his authority, in the name of foreign policy, to take this nation
into war. .. 66
IV. THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
Treaty-making is also meant to be a joint function of the executive
and legislative branches. The Constitution provides in Article if Section
2, that "The President shall have Power . . . to make Treaties," but
only "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," a two-thirds
vote of the Senate being requisite. Moreover, Article VI states, "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of
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the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Thus, treaties
made by the President and two-thirds of the Senate, without any con-
currence by the House of Representatives, have the status of laws on
domestic issues which require a majority of both houses.
The President, however, has encroached on the power of the Senate
-"sapped the Senate's role in treaty making, '67 so that many things
which used to be done by treaty are now done by employing executive
agreements, made by the President alone and not absolutely requiring
any congressional approval. 68 Executive agreements to commit the United
States in relations with other nations are now resorted to more freely
than in the past,69 and the theory has developed that almost anything-
from Franklin Roosevelt's destroyer-to-Britain deal during World War
II, to fishing rights, boundary disputes, or annexation of territory70-- can
be done by executive agreements.
Treaties, as part of the law of the land under Article V1, may super.
cede former laws regarding domestic policy to the extent they are in
conflict with them; however, executive agreements should not change
existing domestic law-or, if they would agree to change diplomatic
law, it would still take a majority of Congress to effect that change.
Executive agreements, on such matters as extradition or postal laws,
for instance, are important and have been used since the beginning of
the Constitution. So it is not a question of whether or not the President
can enter into executive agreements with other governments; rather, the
question is what scope they may validly take today.7
Executive agreements may be binding on a President as long as he
is President, but they could not be considered as binding on the state.
For example, during World War II this country agreed by the United
Nations Agreement not to initiate peace without the consent of all the
Allies, but the President could hardly have bound a future President so.
While the President is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, with
full power to make all agreements dealing with war, he must watch his
step when he comes into the post-war period. Peace-making is a function
of Congress. The secret international arrangements made at Yalta and
Teheran, momentous political agreements which "were to form the de facto
settlement of World War II," were never submitted to Congress for
approval. 72
In the field of trade, also, an executive agreement known as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) assumed that the
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Executive could go beyond his power to raise or lower all tariffs by
reciprocal trade agreements,73 although the power to make changes in
our tariffs rests with the legislative branch.
A proposal providing for the approval of all executive agreements
in order to curb the tendency to take almost any action by such agree-
ments-in lieu of the treaty method prescribed in the Constitution-is
suggested by a constitutional amendment containing the basic principles
Senator John W. Bricker had incorporated in his amendment:
SECTION 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.
SECTION 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law
in the United States only through legislation which would be valid
in the absence of treaty.
SECTION 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all execu-
tive and other agreements with any foreign power or international
organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limita-
tions imposed on treaties by this article.7 4
The Bricker Amendment, introduced January 7, 1953, during the
83rd Congress, was co-sponsored by sixty-three other Senators, and re-
ceived the active support of the American Bar Association. The Senate
Judiciary Committee studied the amendment, and recognized the dangers
inherent in "treaty law" and the importance of a constitutional amend-
ment to more clearly define the scope and effect of treaties and executive
agreements.75 In its report the Committee stated:
This Amendment will not affect the present method of negotiat-
ing and ratifying treaties. Treaties will continue to be negotiated by
the President and ratified with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senators present and voting. This Amendment will not inter.
fere with legitimate activities of the United Nations. The Amend.
ment will not prevent the Senate from concluding a treaty otherwise
valid under the Constitution on any subject whatsoever, nor will it
affect in any manner treaties which do not make internal law in the
United States, but it will make impossible the participation of any
foreign nation, by the treaty method, in the affairs of the citizens of
the several States of the United States. 76
Due to the importance of the issue, Senator Bricker should have
had more co-operation. It was reported that "President Eisenhower's
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attitude was first mildly favorable but ultimately strongly averse to the
Ohio Senator's enterprise," and when the Senator attempted to re-intro-
duce a similar resolution in 1957, The New York Times, on January
26, expressed the hope "that Mr. Bricker will not be able to surmount
those difficulties in amending the Constitution any better this year
than he has in the past and that the Administration will give him no
encouragement."
7 7
In point of fact, the Constitution has become clouded in doubt and
uncertainty over Article VI, setting-up treaties on a par with the Consti-
tution itself. The very definite danger of a treaty suddenly superseding
the Constitution ought to be dealt with. John Foster Dulles spoke of such
dangers in an address delivered before the Regional Meeting of the
American Bar Association at Louisville, Kentucky, April 12, 1952:
The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power liable to
abuse. Treaties make international law and also make domestic
law. Under our Constitution treaties become supreme law of the
land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for con-
gressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitu-
tion, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution. Treaties . . .
can take powers away from Congress and give them to the President
. . . can take powers from the State and give them to the Federal
Government or to some international body and . . . can cut across
the rights given the people by the constitutional Bill if Rights. 71
There is some merit in the suggestion that a revision of the method
by which treaties are made be considered. The present system requires
a two-thirds vote that has been very difficult to obtain at times. This
fact has led many advocates to favor the executive agreement as a means
of side-stepping the severities of treaty-making requirements. This is a
reason for concern in a "democratic form of government" where matters
of foreign policy should be adopted with the consent of the people's
representatives. Critical examination and full discussion of any policy
by members of Congress is essential if the best programs possible are
to be formed. There may be modifications or other changes in policy
suggested that the President follow, and this would certainly improve the
chance of a policy becoming the permanent policy of the American peo-
ple. What is needed, in any event, is a more exact definition of treaties
and executive agreements than exists at present.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the world has grown smaller, this nation has become more and
more caught up in the problems of foreign affairs. The increased im-
portance of foreign policy has had its effect on every feature of American
life. Commensurate with this has been the claim of Chief Executives for
more power in the field of foreign policy-until the powers now claimed
far exceed those held by President Roosevelt during the second World
War.
The now-customary policy of making secret executive agreements,
such as the vital decisions made at Yalta, has circumvented the treaty-
making powers of the Senate in freely debating and examining the wis-
dom of fundamental principles in our foreign policy which might com-
mit the country to important, though dangerous, obligations. Woodrow
Wilson denounced such secret diplomacy and demanded open covenants
openly arrived at.
The action of Presidents to commit United States land forces to
Asia-in Korea, in Vietnam and in Cambodia-or, conceivably, to Eu-
rope under the North Atlantic Pact, is an usurpation of the power to
make war in clear violation of the Constitution.
The Founders of the Constitution expected the character of the
office of President of the United States to be one of initiative. It was
expected that the Executive assume and display a certain amount of
initiative through wielding his administrative powers. The Presidency was
so created because the weakness of a government without an executive
head had been revealed under the Articles of Confederation. The Con-
gress, as a legislature, was not a body for prompt, decisive action. It is
a deliberative body and moves more slowly, as it should do. Like a good,
sound jury, passing on matters that come before it, Congress considers
all points of view on a matter so that it may act intelligently. In the
very nature of Congress lies its essential weakness.
The Constitution intended, however, that both the executive and
legislative branches co-operate in the conduct of foreign policy. While
the powers of the President are granted in general terms so as not to
embarrass the Executive within the wide possible range of policy he may
operate, his field of action is plainly defined under the Constitution or
existing law. The system of constitutional limitations imposes certain
restraints on the exercise of government power which have prevented
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democracy from destroying itself. This constitutional balance between
power and responsibility in foreign policy, may be summarized, as
follows :79
The President makes treaties, but two-thirds of the Senate is required
to give them legal life.
The President, as Commander in Chief, may send the armed forces
abroad, but only Congress can declare war.
The President may control the governmental instruments for the
making of foreign policy, but Congress, through its appropriation powers,
provides the funds enabling those instruments to operate.
Congress, representing the people, provides a method of finding
out what a majority of those people want. In shaping policy, it is a part
of our democratic system that basic elements of foreign policy shall be
submitted to Congress and the public for debate. Indeed, members of
Congress have an obligation under the Constitution and their oaths of
office to offer constructive criticism on policies which may lead to un-
necessary war, weaken the internal economy of the country, or commit
the nation to other obligations it is utterly unable to perform, and, thus,
discredit it in the eyes of the world. This serves as a safeguard against
such fatal errors in foreign policy as might bring about the destruction
of a state and a people.
The general practice of cloaking in secrecy all initial steps of foreign
policy has deprived the Congress of the substance of the power con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution. One may consider that the criticism
directed at the President here is not a criticism of the President's initia-
tive, but a criticism of Congress itself for acquiescing. Recently, Congress
has moved impressively towards reasserting its rights and prerogatives by
re-establishing constitutional guidelines for the President's field of action.
If the arbitrary and unlimited powers of a President are not barred, the
President stands to become a complete dictator, disregarding the Con-
stitution and every fundamental principle upon which the country was
founded, with the power, even in the realm of domestic activities, to
force upon the Congress policies necessarily related to any foreign com-
mitment.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in his opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, wrote
that "no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign
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affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country .....
The implications of circumscribing freedom at home are disquieting
to those who understand the primary purpose of United States foreign
policy to be maintaining the liberty of the American people. While it
is easy to delegate the powers of government to a dictator, it is difficult
to recover those powers once they have been delegated. The student of
history knows that the delegation of legislative powers to an executive was
the first step toward autocracy in Germany. Such a thing will not happen
in this country if the essential restraints which the Founding Fathers so
wisely imposed are not construed away, for to construe away constitu-
tional limitations until they have no meaning is to destroy the Con-
stitution itself.
Benjamin Franklin said the Framers of the Constitution had given
the people a Republic if they could keep it so. That is the vital question
the government must decide. It is time to return to what John Marshall
called a government of laws, not of men, and where the duly elected
representatives of the people in Congress should have a determined and
decisive voice in decisions of foreign policy. Happily, Congress has
recently shown itself willing - if not eager - to embrace its constitu-
tionally-mandated role as spokesman for the American people in deciding
whether or not American soldiers should be sent to war. It is the one
encouraging flicker in an area that requires the intensity of a beacon.
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